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I conduct an analysis of the possible determinants of sovereign credit ratings assigned 
by the two leading credit rating agencies, Moody's and Standard and Poor's, by using 
both a linear and a logistic transformation of the rating scales. Of the large number of 
variables that can be used, the set of explanatory variables selected in this study is 
significant in explaining the credit ratings. Namely, six variables appear to be the 
most relevant to determine a country's credit rating: GDP per capita, external debt, 
level of economic development, default history, real growth rate and inflation rate. 
 
 
Keywords: Credit ratings; sovereign debt 
 





                                               










1 – Introduction .......................................................................................…. 3 
2 – Rating systems ………………………………………………………… 3 
3 – Rating determinants …………………………………………………… 8 
4 – Estimations and results discussion …………………………………… 12 
          4.1 – Using a linear transformation ………………………….……... 12 
          4.2 – Using a logistic transformation ................................................. 19 
5 – Conclusion …………………………………………………………….. 25 
Annex ……………………………………………………………………... 27 





















1 - Introduction 
 
The relevance of rating the creditworthiness of sovereign borrowers arises from the 
fact that national governments are by far the largest issuers on capital markets and 
also because those country ratings are seen as a ceiling to public and private sector 
issues. The financial literature devoted to modelling sovereign credit rating is rather 
sparse. Nevertheless, some examples of this line of research are Cosset and Roy 
(1991), Moon and Stotsky (1993), Lee (1993), Cantor and Packer (1997) and Larrain, 
Helmut and Maltzan (1997). 
 
This paper studies the factors that seem to play an important role in determining 
sovereign debt rating. For that purpose, I collected information concerning several 
quantitative and qualitative variables for a universe of 81 developed and developing 
countries, and also the ratings assigned to those countries by Standard & Poor’s and 
Moody’s in June 2001. With this sectional sample an attempt is made to replicate the 
effective ratings given by those two agencies.  This is done using both a linear and a 
logistic transformation of the rating levels. 
 
The organisation of the paper is as follows. The next section describes briefly the 
more commonly used rating notation systems for sovereign public debt; the rating 
model estimated in this paper is discussed in section three; the results are reported in 
section four and section five contains a summary and conclusions. 
 
2 - Rating systems 
 
The rating classification of sovereign public debt is, somehow, an assessment of the 
economic, financial and political situation of an economy, giving also a measure of 
the country development. In fact, higher default risk premiums are associated with 
lower rating and higher government yields, increasing therefore the financing cost of 
the government. While there is a large number of credit rating agencies, the more well 
known are Moody’s Investment Service, Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Duff Phelps 
Credit Rating Co. and Fitch IBCA, Inc.1 There seems also to be a kind of duopoly 
                                               
1 S&P's history can be traced back to 1860 (see Kunczik (2001)). 
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between the first two agencies, responsible for around 80 per cent of the credit rating 
market.2 Table 1 presents, as an example, the rating levels and a summary description, 
given by Moody’s, of the government bonds that receive those classifications. Under 
the conventions used, the notation AAA and Aaa are the highest rating classification 
assigned respectively by S&P and by Moody’s. 
 
Table 1 – Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s rating systems 
 
Rating Characterization of debt and issuer (source: Moody’s) 
 S&P Moody’s 
Bonds, which are Aaa, are judged to be of the best quality. They carry the smallest 
degree of investment risk and are generally referred to as "gilt edged." Interest 
payments are protected by a large or by an exceptionally stable margin and 
principal is secure. While the various protective elements are likely to change, 
such changes as can be visualized are most unlikely to impair the fundamentally 




Bonds, which are rated Aa, are judged to be of high quality by all standards. 
Together with the Aaa group they comprise what are generally known as high-
grade bonds. They are rated lower than the best bonds because margins of 
protection may not be as large as in Aaa securities or fluctuation of protective 
elements may be of greater amplitude or there may be other elements present 
which make the long-term risk appear somewhat larger than the Aaa securities. AA- Aa3 
A+ A1 
A A2 
Bonds, which are rated A, possess many favourable investment attributes and are 
to be considered as upper-medium-grade obligations. Factors giving security to 
principal and interest are considered adequate, but elements may be present 
which suggest a susceptibility to impairment some time in the future. A- A3 
BBB+ Baa1 
BBB Baa2 
Bonds, which are rated Baa, are considered as medium-grade obligations (i.e., 
they are neither highly protected nor poorly secured). Interest payments and 
principal security appear adequate for the present but certain protective elements 
may be lacking or may be characteristically unreliable over any great length of 
time. Such bonds lack outstanding investment characteristics and in fact have 




Bonds, which are rated Ba, are judged to have speculative elements; their future 
cannot be considered as well assured. Often the protection of interest and 
principal payments may be very moderate, and thereby not well safeguarded 
during both good and bad times over the future. Uncertainty of position 




Bonds, which are rated B, generally lack characteristics of the desirable 
investment. Assurance of interest and principal payments or of maintenance of 
other terms of the contract over any long period of time may be small. B- B3 
CCC+ Caa1 
CCC Caa2 
Bonds, which are rated Caa, are of poor standing. Such issues may be in default 
or there may be present elements of danger with respect to principal or interest. 
CCC- Caa3 
Bonds, which are rated Ca, represent obligations, which are speculative in a high 
degree. Such issues are often in default or have other marked shortcomings. 
CC Ca 
Bonds, which are rated C, are the lowest rated class of bonds, and issues so rated 
can be regarded as having extremely poor prospects of ever attaining any real 
investment standing. 
C C 
                                               
2 A more complete reference about rating agencies may be found in the Asian Development Bank 
site, http://aric.adb.org/links/crerat.asp and also in BIS (2000). 
 
 5
In this study, I used the rating classifications of S&P and Moody’s, in June 2001, for a 
sample consisting of 81 countries. In this country sample, there are 29 developed 
countries and 52 developing countries.3 The rating classifications for external 
government debt, for each country, are presented in Table 2.  
 
Table 2 – External debt rating classifications: June 2001 
Country Rating Country Rating 
 S&P Moody’s  S&P Moody’s 
Argentina B B2 Lithuania BBB- Ba1 
Australia AA+ Aa2 Luxemburg AAA Aaa 
Austria AAA Aaa Malaysia BBB Baa2 
Barbados A- Baa2 Malta A A3 
Belgium AA+ Aa1 Mexico BB+ Baa3 
Belize BB Ba2 Mongolia B  
Bolivia B+ B1 Morocco BB Ba1 
Botswana A A2 Netherlands AAA Aaa 
Brazil BB- B1 New Zealand AA+ Aa2 
Bulgaria B+ B2 Norway AAA Aaa 
Canada AA+ Aa1 Oman BBB Baa2 
Chile A- Baa1 Pakistan B- Caa1 
China BBB A3 Panama BB+ Ba1 
Colombia BB Ba2 Papua New Guinea B+ B1 
Costa Rica BB Ba1 Paraguay B B2 
Cyprus A A2 Peru BB- Ba3 
Czech Republic A- Baa1 Philippines BB+ Ba1 
Denmark AAA Aaa Poland BBB+ Baa1 
Dominican Repub. B+ B1 Portugal AA Aa2 
Egypt BBB- Ba1 Qatar BBB+ Baa2 
El Salvador BB+ Baa3 Romania B- B3 
Estonia BBB+ Baa1 Russia B- B3 
Finland AA+ Aaa Senegal B+  
France AAA Aaa Singapore AAA Aa1 
Germany AAA Aaa Slovakia BB+ Ba1 
Greece A A2 Slovenia A A2 
Hong Kong A+ A3 South Africa BBB- Baa3 
Hungary A- A3 Spain AA+ Aa2 
Iceland A+ Aa3 Suriname B-  
India BB Ba2 Sweden AA+ Aa1 
Ireland AA+ Aaa Switzerland AAA Aaa 
Israel A- A2 Taiwan AA+ Aa3 
Italy AA Aa3 Thailand BBB- Baa3 
Jamaica B+ Ba3 Trinidad & Tobago BBB- Baa3 
Japan AA+ Aa1 Tunisia BBB  
Jordan BB- Ba3 Turkey B- B1 
Kazakhstan BB Ba2 UK AAA Aaa 
Korea BBB Baa2 EUA AAA Aaa 
Kuwait A Baa1 Uruguay BBB- Baa3 
Latvia BBB Baa2 Venezuela B B2 
Lebanon B+ B1    
Source: S&P, available at http://www.standardandpoors.com; 
Moody’s, available at http://www.moodys.com. 
                                               
3 As reported by the IMF (2001) classification. 
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Only countries with rating notation between AAA (Aaa) and B- (B3) were selected, in 
order to avoid lower quality bonds, eventually with more speculative characteristics. 
One should notice that this sample has around 29 per cent of countries with rating 
classification equal or above AA (using for instance the S&P notation), and that 56 
per cent of the selected countries had an assigned rating below the A- notch, as one 
may confirm by Table 3. Also, there are around 35-37 per cent of countries whose 
rating falls below the investment grade cut off (starting at BB+ or Ba1). 
 
Table 3 – Comparing sovereign foreign currency ratings assigned by S&P and 





(% of sample) 
Moody’s 
(% of sample) 
AAA 
(Aaa) 14 16 
AA+ or AA 
(Aa1 or Aa2) 15 12 
Between AA- and A- 
(Between Aa3 and A3) 16 16 
Between BBB+ and BBB- 
(Between Baa1 and Baa3), 
investment grade cut off 19 22 
BB+ and lower (Ba1 and lower), 
speculative grade begins 37 35 
 






Obviously, some transformation between qualitative information and cardinal 
variables is always needed before doing some empirical estimation.4 In order to get 
appropriate data to implement empirical estimations, it is necessary to perform a 
numerical transformation of the rating notches into numbers. Therefore, one may 
construct a variable RATING that takes numeric values between 1 and 16, defined 
according to the notation levels of the two rating agencies, using a linear 
transformation. For instance, to the rating level B- (B3), corresponds the value 1 for 
the variable RATING, to the rating level AAA (Aaa), corresponds the maximum value 
of 16 for the variable RATING. The correspondence between the rating levels and the 
values given to the RATING variable is presented in Table 4.  
 
                                               
4 For instance Cantor and Packer (1996) use also 16 levels while Larrain et al. (1997) use 20 
levels, taking therefore into account the C notches of the rating scales. 
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Table 4 – Linear transformation of the rating levels 
 
 Rating levels 
S&P B- B B+ BB- BB BB+ BBB- BBB BBB+ 
Moody’s B3 B2 B1 Ba3 Ba2 Ba1 Baa3 Baa2 Baa1 
          
RATING 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 Rating levels 
S&P A- A A+ AA- AA AA+ AAA   
Moody’s A3 A2 A1 Aa3 Aa2 Aa1 Aaa   
          
RATING 10 11 12 13 14 15 16   
 
According to the qualitative notations and the cardinal transformation reported, one 
may notice a few points. All the EU-15 countries had at the time (June 2001) a rating 
level of at least A (A2), which was the notation attributed to Greece, with most of the 
countries with ratings between AAA (Aaa) or AA (Aa). Also, and considering the 
classification of developed countries used by the IMF, all these countries have a rating 
level equal to or above A. In other words, the rating level appears clearly correlated 
with the development of the country. 
 
Another point to mention is that the rating levels given by the two agencies are quite 
similar. In fact, the difference between the two classifications is never higher than 2 
points, according to the cardinal classification used in this paper, except for the 
following countries: Barbados, China, Kuwait, Taiwan and Turkey. For the entire 
country sample, one may also see that Moody’s gives a better rating than S&P to only 
11 countries, and that S&P assigns better ratings to only 17 countries. In terms of the 
cardinal classification used in this paper, this means, for this country sample, an 
accumulated difference of 13 and 21 points respectively for Moody’s and for S&P. 
These differences suggest probably both the use of different explanatory factors and 
different weights by each agency in their rating methodologies. There could be also 
some attempt by the agencies to gain market share, by giving some countries a notch 
more than the competitors. 5 
 
Additionally, for the EU-15 countries, the notations of the two agencies are basically 
the same, except for a difference of one point in four countries. Moody’s assigns to 
                                               
5 For instance, with data for 252 US municipal government debt, Moon and Stotsky (1992) 
mention that there was some tendency for S&P to give a better rating than Moody’s. 
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Ireland and Finland a better rating than the one proposed by S&P, while S&P gives 
Italy and Spain better ratings than Moody’s does. Even if “split rating” at a letter 
grade commonly occurs, this may give conflicting information to potential investors.  
 
3 – Rating determinants 
 
To assess the credit risk of governments is not an easy task. One must take into 
account both solvency facts and aspects such as the stability of the political system, 
social cohesion and the degree of interdependence with international economic and 
financial systems.6 It is also worthwhile noticing that sovereigns, unlike corporate 
issuers, are less likely to face claims from creditors if the circumstance of a default 
arises. This is true even if governments have an incentive to make payments, resulting 
from the possibility of capital market autarky. 
 
Among the factors that might influence the attribution of a higher or lower rating level 
to each sovereign issuance, one may mention for instance the political stability of the 
country, the level of external debt, the evidence on previous issuances and eventual 
defaults, information about the public accounts, indicators of economic performance 
and the degree of the country development.7 
 
After a first analysis, where was assessed the correlation of several variables with the 
cardinal variable RATING, and the plausibility of the economic relations, the 
following variables were selected: per capita GDP; inflation rate; GDP real growth 
rate; development indicator; default indicator; external debt-exports ratio (this 
variable is only relevant for developing countries); government deficit as a percentage 
of GDP. Variables such as the current account deficit as a percentage of GDP, central 
government spending as a percentage of GDP or the debt-to-GDP ratio, turned out to 
be poorly correlated with the rating classifications.8 
 
                                               
6 See for instance Bulow and Rogoff (1989) and also Bulow (1992) for the differences between 
corporate and sovereign default. 
7 The rationale for several of these factors is discussed namely by Edwards (1984), Haque et al. 
(1996), Cantor and Packer (1996) while Haque, Mark and Mathieson (1998) assess the importance 
of political factors. One may also see for instance the criteria definition used by Moody’s (2001). 
8 Nevertheless, both the current account deficit and the debt-to-GDP ratio were used in the 
estimations but with no significant result. 
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In what follows, some theoretical and intuitive explanations are given about the 
contribution of the aforementioned set of explanatory variables, to the determination 
of sovereign debt ratings. 
  
GDP per capita is supposedly a measure of the country development and can be seen 
as an indicator of the tax basis available in the economy. Also, countries high lower 
GDP per capita may be less able to solve debt service problems by implementing 
austerity measures. Therefore, the bigger GDP per capita the more likely is the 
attribution of a higher rating level. 
 
Inflation rate has two opposite effects on the existing stock of government debt. In 
one hand, an increase of inflation improves the public debt dynamics by reducing the 
real value of government debt, in the other hand a rise in inflation contributes 
negatively to the debt dynamics because it makes it necessary for the government to 
pay higher nominal interest rates.  
 
Also, high inflation may signal excess demand or labour market distortions. 
Additionally it may also imply some lack of capacity for a country to finance its 
public expenditures using only public revenues and issuing public debt. Economic 
history has already several episodes were countries resorted to printing money in 
order to meet their borrowing requirements. One should therefore expect to see a 
negative relation between the level of the rating and inflation rate. 
 
Economy real growth allows, on its own, ceteris paribus, for a relative decrease of the 
country indebtedness, making it easier to face future debt service related payments, 
decreasing also the cyclical component of the primary budget balance.9 Besides this, a 
growing economy is more likely to absorb excess labour supply, to decrease 
unemployment, increase living standards and to downplay possible social conflicts 
and political instability.10 One should therefore expect economic growth to be 
positively correlated with the rating levels. 
 
                                               
9 For instance, Alesina et al. (1992) found a significant negative correlation between industrial 
production rate and the interest rate differential between government debt and private debt. 
10 Bayoumi et al. (1995) mention for the US a positive correlation between the unemployment rate 
and the credit spreads of US public debt. 
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The degree of development of a country is in principle already taken into account 
when one uses information concerning the GDP per capita. However, the analysis of 
the data reveals that rating agencies attribute a smaller probability of default to the 
countries labelled as developed. This indicator has one of the highest correlations with 
the rating level, around 0,85 for the country sample used in this paper, being therefore 
reasonable to assume a positive relation between these two variables. Indeed, high-
ranking countries are invariably those with higher GDP per capita. 
 
The default history of sovereigns is an extremely important factor to assess the 
credibility of Governments to meet their future responsibilities. Obviously, a history 
of partial or total defaults ends up being penalized with lower rating levels. 11 
 
Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz (1986, pp 482-483) define a default situation as follows: 
“Whenever the borrower gives resources to the lender that are less than the fixed 
amount he is committed to pay the lender, then there is a default.” Some examples of 
sovereign distress in the capital markets occurred with Argentina and Brazil in 1989-
90, the Mexican crisis of 1994-95 and Russia in 1997. 
 
A significant external debt-to-exports ratio is generally associated with a greater 
default risk, since the source of foreign currency, exports, may not be enough to 
ensure the debt payments. A country where this ratio is high is more likely to be 
adversely affected by changes in the terms of trade or a decrease in foreign demand.12 
This indicator should then have a negative contribution for the assigned rate level, and 
this is particularly true for developing countries. Indeed, for most developing 
countries, exports are the main source of foreign exchange earnings. 
 
Concerning public finance variables, the variable that seems to be more relevant is the 
budget balance. A high budget deficit suggests that a given economy is having 
difficulties in raising enough public revenues and/or keeping a sound control of public 
                                               
11 Eaton and Fernandez (1995) discuss the incentives that sovereigns have to reimburse their 
public debt while Rose (2002) sustains that sovereign default also ends up in a decline in 
international trade. From the large literature on sovereign risk and default Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(1996) provide a survey. 
12 It is also important to assess the structure of the external debt, since low external debt-to-exports 




expenditures in order to minimize public accounts unbalances. Therefore, budget 
surpluses should be positively correlated with higher ratings. 
 
Additionally, the debt-to-GDP ratio turned out to be significantly uncorrelated with 
the rating level, and the same was true with public expenditures as a percentage of 
GDP. 
 
The general model to estimate is as follows: 
  
iiiiii DEBTXDEVELOPGDPGRINFLGDPPCRATING 543210 αααααα +++++=                                
iii BUDGETDEFDEBTX 765 ααα +++                                     (1) 
 
where we have: 
RATING – quantitative variable, obtained by linear (logistic) transformation, 
GDPPC – per capita GDP, values for 2000, thousands of dollars; 
INFL – inflation rate, average of the last 3 years (1998-2000), 
GDPGR – real GDP growth rate, average of the last 3 years (1998-2000), 








DEBTX – external debt-to-exports ratio = exp)/)(1( edebtDEVELOP− , 
with ,  edebt – external debt, values for 2000, 
exp – exports, values for 2000, 
 






, that assesses if the country 
defaulted either on interest or principal payments, since 1975, 
 
BUDGET – budget balance as a percentage of GDP, average of the last 3 
years (1998-2000). 
 
According to what was said above, it seems therefore reasonable to anticipate the 
following signs for the coefficients of each variable in equation (1): α1 > 0 (per capita 
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GDP); α2 < 0 (inflation); α3 > 0 (GDP real growth); α4 > 0 (developed country 
indicator); α5 < 0 (external debt-to-exports ratio); α6 < 0 (default indicator) and α7 > 0 
(budget balance). 
 
4 – Estimations and results discussions 
 
Equation (1) was estimated using OLS. An attempt was also made in order to estimate 
a multinomial Logit, however, the absence of a significant number of values for the 
dependent variable and a reduced number of sectional data, prevents the maximum 
likelihood convergence of the coefficients. 
 
4.1 – Using a linear transformation 
 
Of the several versions tried for equation (1), only the more statistically significant are 
presented. The estimations were carried out using the two series for the RATING 
variable, according to the ratings of S&P or Moody’s, with the linear transformation 
constructed in section two. The results for the S&P data are reported on Table 5, and 
allow us to conclude that all the coefficients have the expected signs. Also, most of 
the coefficients are indeed statistically different from zero. 
 
Regarding the S&P notations, the best models seem to be S2 and S3 of Table 5. The 
two models, vis-à-vis model S1, for instance, enhance the role of the variables that try 
to capture the information from the default history and from the ratio of external debt 
to exports. In other words, these two factors appear as highly important in 
determining and explaining the rating level, and are both, as expected, negatively 
related to sovereign credit quality. Remember also that the explanatory variable 
external debt-to-exports ratio is only being used for the developing countries. 
 
The budget balance variable, as a percentage of GDP, even if it has the correct sign, is 
not unequivocally statistically significant, since its estimated coefficient is only 
different from zero at the 15 per cent level, as one may observe from the results of 




Table 5 – Estimation of equation (1), S&P data, using a linear transformation 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 




















































DEFAULT (α6)  -2.3381 * 
(-2.93) 
  -2.2650 ** 
(-2.58) 




Adjust. R2  0.8326 0.8496 0.8636 0.8601 0.8391 
DW 1.772 1.821 2.010 2.062 1.896 
Nº of observations 72 72 71 71 71 
The t statistics are in parentheses. * - Significant at the 1% level; ** - Significant at the 5% 
level; *** - Significant at the 10% level. 
 
Concerning the estimations with the rating data for Moody’s, one gets rather similar 
results, reported on Table 6. 
 
Table 6 – Estimation of equation (1), Moody’s data, using a linear 
transformation 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 


































 0.3042 * 
(2.65) 
 















DEFAULT (α6) -3.1596 * 
(-3.86) 










Adjust. R2 0.8607 0.8707 0.8660 0.8654 0.8527 
DW 1.927 1.919 1.881 2.02 1.94 
Nº of observations 70 69 69 70 70 
The t statistics are in parentheses. * - Significant at the 1% level; ** - Significant at the 5% 




Once more all the coefficients have the expected sign, and the budget balance now 
turns out to be statistically different from zero, at least at a level of 10 and 5 per cent, 
respectively in models M4 and M5. Nevertheless, the models without the budget 
balance variable and with GDP real growth rate seem to be statistically more 
adequate. It is interesting to point also to the significance of the explanatory variable 
DEVELOP in all models of tables 5 and 6, corroborating, as expected, the initial idea 
that the so-called developing countries have lower credit ratings. Inflation has also 
rather meaningful information to explain the rating levels, with low inflation countries 
getting a better notation from both agencies, in all versions of the model. 
 
After several simulations with all the estimated models, models S3 and M2 were 
selected as the more suitable in replicating the ratings given by the two agencies. The 
estimated ratings are quite similar, with both models presenting an absolute 
percentage average error of around 30 per cent. 
 
Table 7 reports the predicted errors from model S3 for 71 countries of the initial 
sample. With this model, the maximum prevision error is 4 notches, and this occurs 
only for 3 countries: Chile, Pakistan and Paraguay. For Chile the model under-
predicts the rating and for the other two countries it delivers an over-prediction of the 
rating level. For the developed countries, one can also notice that the absolute 
prediction error is always equal to or below 2 notches. Also, the absolute prediction 
errors obtained from this model do not go beyond 1 notch for 42 of the 71 countries. 
 
For the EU-12 countries one may also mention some results. The maximum absolute 
error is 2 notches, with zero error for 4 countries: Belgium, Finland, Italy and 
Luxemburg. The model assigns a better rating to only two countries: Ireland (1 notch 
more) and Greece (2 notches more). Also, the model suggests a lower rating for the 6 
remaining countries of the EU-12: France, Netherlands and Portugal (minus 1 notch), 
Austria, Germany and Spain (minus 2 notches).13  
 
 
                                               
13 The prediction errors from the same model with Moody’s data, model M2, are quite identical, 
and therefore are not presented here. 
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Table 7 – Prediction errors: model S3 from Table 5, linear transformation 
 











P – R 
Argentina B 2 3 1 Lithuania BBB- 7 7 0 
Australia AA+ 15 14 -1 Luxembourg AAA 16 16 0 
Austria AAA 16 14 -2 Malaysia BBB 8 7 -1 
Barbados A- 10 8 -2 Malta A 11 9 -2 
Belgium AA+ 15 15 0 Mexico BB+ 6 7 1 
Bolivia B+ 3 4 1  Morocco BB 5 6 1 
Brazil BB- 4 4 0 Netherlands AAA 16 15 -1 
Bulgaria B+ 3 6 3 New Zealand AA+ 15 13 -2 
Canada AA+ 15 14 -1 Norway AAA 16 16 0 
Chile A- 10 6 -4 Pakistan B- 1 5 4 
China BBB 8 8 0 Panama BB+ 6 7 1 
Colombia BB 5 4 -1 P. New Guinea B+ 3 5 2 
Cyprus A 11 14 3 Paraguay B 2 6 4 
Czech Rep. A- 10 7 -3 Peru BB- 4 4 0 
Denmark AAA 16 15 -1 Philippines BB+ 6 6 0 
Egypt BBB- 7 7 0 Poland BBB+ 9 6 -3 
El Salvador BB+ 6 7 1 Portugal AA 14 13 -1 
Estonia BBB+ 9 7 -2 Romania B- 1 1 0 
Finland AA+ 15 15 0 Russia B- 1 2 1 
France AAA 16 15 -1 Singapore AAA 16 16 0 
Germany AAA 16 14 -2 Slovakia BB+ 6 6 0 
Greece A 11 13 2 Slovenia A 11 8 -3 
Hong Kong A+ 12 15 3 South Africa BBB- 7 7 0 
Hungary A- 10 7 -3 Spain AA+ 15 13 -2 
Iceland A+ 12 15 3 Sweden AA+ 15 15 0 
India BB 5 7 2 Switzerland AAA 16 16 0 
Ireland AA+ 15 16 1 Taiwan AA+ 15 13 -2 
Israel A- 10 13 3 Thailand BBB- 7 6 -1 
Italy AA 14 14 0 Trin. and Tob. BBB- 7 8 1 
Jamaica B+ 3 6 3 Tunisia BBB 8 7 -1 
Japan AA+ 15 15 0 Turkey B- 1 1 0 
Jordan BB- 4 7 3 UK AAA 16 14 -2 
Kazakhstan BB 5 6 1 USA AAA 16 16 0 
Korea BBB 8 8 0 Uruguay BBB- 7 4 -3 
Latvia BBB 8 7 -1 Venezuela B 2 4 2 
Lebanon B+ 3 6 3      
 
Figure 1 illustrates the prediction power of model S3, leading also to some additional 
conclusions. For instance, two countries with the same effective rating level, as 
Portugal and Italy, are set apart by 1 notch by the model, with Italy getting a better 
estimated rating. One of the reasons for this simulation result is the fact that GDP per 
capita is in Portugal roughly half of its Italian counterpart, respectively 11266 and 






















Also, and considering now two EU-12 countries with similar a GDP per capita, 
Portugal and Greece (11780 US dollars), it is possible to see that the model assigns 
them, in round figures, the same rating, while the effective ratings are set apart by 3 
notches, with Greece having the lower rating. In this case, the circumstance that 
Greece did not make it to euro group from the start may have affected negatively the 
rating of its sovereign debt. 
 
GDP per capita is rather influential in the estimated models. Nevertheless, notice for 
instance that the S3 model predicts 2 notches below the effective rating level for 
Austria and Germany, two countries with similar GDP per capita, respectively 23142 
and 24091 dollars. Also, there is a prediction of only 1 notch below the effective 
rating for France and Netherlands, countries where the GDP per capita is respectively 
26919 and 27851 dollars. GDP real growth rate must be playing here an important 
role since the average real growth rate, between 1998 and 2000, was 3,2 per cent in 
France and only 2,2 per cent in Germany. 
 
Concerning the models estimated using Moody’s data, the prediction errors from 




Table 8 – Prediction errors: model M4 from Table 6, linear transformation 
 











P – R 
Argentina B2 2 3 1 Lithuania Ba1 6 6 0 
Australia Aa2 14 14 0 Luxembourg Aaa 16 16 0 
Austria Aaa 16 14 -2 Malaysia Baa2 8 7 -1 
Barbados Baa2 8 8 0 Malta A3 10 7 -3 
Belgium Aa1 15 14 -1 Mexico Baa3 7 7 0 
Bolivia B1 3 3 0  Morocco Ba1 6 6 0 
Brazil B1 3 6 3 Netherlands Aaa 16 15 -1 
Bulgaria B2 2 7 5 New Zealand Aa2 14 13 -1 
Canada Aa1 15 14 -1 Norway Aaa 16 16 0 
Chile Baa1 9 7 -2 Pakistan Caa1 1 3 2 
China A3 10 8 -2 Panama Ba1 6 4 -2 
Colombia Ba2 5 5 0 P. New Guinea B1 3 5 2 
Cyprus A2 11 13 2 Paraguay B2 2 6 4 
Czech Rep. Baa1 9 6 -3 Peru Ba3 4 3 -1 
Denmark Aaa 16 16 0 Philippines Ba1 6 6 0 
Egypt Ba1 6 7 1 Poland Baa1 9 7 -2 
El Salvador Baa3 7 7 0 Portugal Aa2 14 12 -2 
Estonia Baa1 9 7 -2 Romania B3 1 2 1 
Finland Aaa 16 16 0 Russia B3 1 1 0 
France Aaa 16 14 -2 Singapore Aa1 15 16 1 
Germany Aaa 16 14 -2 Slovakia Ba1 6 6 0 
Greece A2 11 12 1 Slovenia A2 11 8 -3 
Hong Kong A3 10 14 4 South Africa Baa3 7 6 -1 
Hungary A3 10 7 -3 Spain Aa2 14 13 -1 
Iceland Aa3 13 16 3 Sweden Aa1 15 15 0 
India Ba2 5 6 1 Switzerland Aaa 16 16 0 
Ireland Aaa 16 17 1 Taiwan Aa3 13 13 0 
Israel A2 11 13 2 Thailand Baa3 7 5 -2 
Italy Aa3 13 13 0 Trin. and Tob. Baa3 7 8 1 
Jamaica Ba3 4 5 1 Turkey B1 3 2 -1 
Japan Aa1 15 14 -1 UK Aaa 16 14 -2 
Jordan Ba3 4 7 3 USA Aaa 16 16 0 
Kazakhstan Ba2 5 6 1 Uruguay Baa3 7 6 -1 
Korea Baa2 8 8 0 Venezuela B2 2 4 2 
Latvia Baa2 8 7 -1      
Lebanon B1 3 5 2      
 
 
The differences between this model (Moody’s data) and model S3 (S&P data), 
besides the rating data, is that model M4 uses the default variable instead of the 
external debt-to-exports ratio and introduces also the budget balance as a regressor. 
The results are similar to the ones already reported for model S3, even with the same 
absolute percentage average error of around 30 per cent, even if the maximum 
prediction error is now 5 notches (for Bulgaria). Furthermore, only for three countries 




Considering the biggest prediction errors from both models (S3 and M4), the set of 
countries that pop up includes Chile, Pakistan, Paraguay, Bulgaria and Hong Kong. If 
the first four countries have low credit ratings, and probably the estimated models 
aren’t performing that well at the low end of the rating scale, the differences in the 
case of Hong Kong, with both models assigning a better rating than the effective one, 
there may be other determinants not considered in the models. For instance, one may 
recall that on July 1, 1997, Hong Kong was returned to the People’s Republic of 
China and became a Special Administrative Region of China. 
 
Concerning now the estimated ratings for the EU-12 countries, there are only minor 
changes from the results of the previous model. The prediction error is null for 4 
countries: Denmark, Finland, Italy and Luxembourg. This model assigns a higher 
rating than the effective rating to the same two countries: Ireland and Greece (plus 1 
notch). Also a lower rating is estimated for 6 countries: Belgium, Netherlands and 
Spain (minus 1 notch), Austria, France, Germany and Portugal (minus 2 notches). 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the prediction ability of the estimated model using Moody’s data 
and allows assessing more clearly the several comments offered above. 
 





















Additionally I constructed the RATING variable as the arithmetic average of the 
ratings assigned by the two agencies, still using the linear transformation. Since the 
estimation results using the rating data in such a way are not substantially different 
from the ones already reported, these results are not presented in the text. 
 
4.2 – Using a logistic transformation 
 
The models estimated so far, based on a linear transformation of the rating levels, 
show some lack of accuracy for the countries located on the top end of the rating 
scale. Another approach was therefore attempted, by using a logistic transformation of 
the ratings, instead of the usual linear transformation. 
 
The idea underlying the use of the logistic transformation is that at the bottom of the 
scale, and since the rating level is low, ratings can rise rather quickly, as the 
sovereigns deliver some improvements. At the top end of the rating scale however, 
the increase of an additional notch is slower, since the requisites of sovereign quality 
are now more demanding. 
 
If one assumes that the functional form that describes the relationship between the 
creditworthiness rating, Ri, normalized to grade each of the countries on a scale of 
zero to one with zero representing the least creditworthy countries and one 
representing the most creditworthy countries, and the set of explanatory variables, X 











= , (2) 
where the vector β´ includes the parameters of the exogenous variables. The logistic 
transformation then becomes 
 [ ] XRRL iii ')1/(ln β=−= , (3) 
 
where Li is the logit of Ri. This equation is not only linear in X, but also linear in the 
parameters and can be estimated using ordinary least squares. Figure 3 compares the 































































The estimation results of equation (3), using the logistic transformation, for the S&P 
ratings are reported on Table 9. 
 
Table 9 – Estimation of equation (3), S&P data, using a logistic transformation 
 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 




















































DEFAULT (α6)  -0.8404 * 
(-2.79) 
  -0.8321 ** 
(-2.56) 




Adjust. R2  0.8410 0.8557 0.8582 0.8581 0.8515 
DW 1.738 1.733 1.8696 1.9558 1.8519 
Nº of observations 72 72 70 70 71 
The t statistics are in parentheses. * - Significant at the 1% level; ** - Significant at the 5% 




All the estimated coefficients have again the expected sign. The results in terms of the 
prediction errors from model S7 (logistic) are reported in Table 10, and are not very 
different from the errors produced by model S3 (linear).  
 
Table 10 – Prevision errors: model S7 from Table 9, logistic transformation 
 











P – R 
Argentina B 2 5 3 Lithuania BBB- 7 6 -1 
Australia AA+ 15 15 0 Luxembourg AAA 16 16 0 
Austria AAA 16 15 1 Malaysia BBB 8 7 -1 
Barbados A- 10 9 -1 Malta A 11 9 -2 
Belgium AA+ 15 15 0 Mexico BB+ 6 6 0 
Bolivia B+ 3 3 0 Morocco BB 5 6 1 
Brazil BB- 4 6 2 Netherlands AAA 16 15 -1 
Bulgaria B+ 3 5 2 New Zealand AA+ 15 14 -1 
Canada AA+ 15 15 0 Norway AAA 16 16 0 
Chile A- 10 7 -3 Pakistan B- 1 4 3 
China BBB 8 8 0 Panama BB+ 6 5 -1 
Colombia BB 5 4 -1 P. New Guinea B+ 3 4 1 
Cyprus A 11 14 3 Paraguay B 2 5 3 
Czech Rep. A- 10 6 -4 Peru BB- 4 3 -1 
Denmark AAA 16 16 0 Philippines BB+ 6 5 -1 
Egypt BBB- 7 7 0 Poland BBB+ 9 6 -3 
El Salvador BB+ 6 7 1 Portugal AA 14 13 -1 
Estonia BBB+ 9 7 -2 Romania B- 1 1 0 
Finland AA+ 15 15 0 Russia B- 1 1 0 
France AAA 16 15 -1 Singapore AAA 16 16 0 
Germany AAA 16 15 -1 Slovakia BB+ 6 6 0 
Greece A 11 13 2 Slovenia A 11 8 -3 
Hong Kong A+ 12 15 3 South Africa BBB- 7 6 -1 
Hungary A- 10 6 -4 Spain AA+ 15 14 -1 
Iceland A+ 12 16 4 Sweden AA+ 15 15 0 
India BB 5 6 1 Switzerland AAA 16 16 0 
Ireland AA+ 15 16 1 Taiwan AA+ 15 14 -1 
Israel A- 10 14 4 Thailand BBB- 7 5 -2 
Italy AA 14 15 1 Trin. and Tob. BBB- 7 8 1 
Jamaica B+ 3 5 2 Tunisia BBB 8 7 -1 
Japan AA+ 15 16 1 Turkey B- 1 1 0 
Jordan BB- 4 7 3 UK AAA 16 15 -1 
Kazakhstan BB 5 5 0 USA AAA 16 16 0 
Korea BBB 8 9 1 Uruguay BBB- 7 6 -1 
Latvia BBB 8 7 -1 Venezuela B 2 3 1 
Lebanon B+ 3 7 4      
 
The maximum prediction error, 4 notches with the logistic transformation, now occurs 
for the Czech Republic, Hong Kong, Hungary, Israel and Lebanon. Nevertheless, the 
logistic transformation does improve the adjustment for the top end of the rating scale 
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and for the entire sample, since the absolute percentage average error is now around 
23 per cent (recall the 30 per cent figure for the model S3, using the linear 
transformation).  
 
For instance, for a sub-set of the developed countries, that are usually the best rated 
sovereigns (EU-15 plus Japan, US, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Norway and 
Switzerland) model S3 gives an accumulated prediction error of 20 points while 
model S7 reduces this margin to 13 points. Also, for the EU-15 countries, prediction 
errors from model S3 add up to 15 points and model S7 now delivers a sum of only 10 
points (see Table 7 and Table 11). Figure 4 supplements the previous analysis by 
depicting the aforementioned prediction differences for model S7.  
 

















The estimation results using both the logistic transformation and data from Moody’s, 








Table 11 – Estimation of equation (3), Moody’s data, using a logistic 
transformation 
 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 

























































DEFAULT (α6)  -1.2990 * 
(-3.86) 
  -1.3610 * 
(-4.07) 




Adjust. R2  0.8105 0.8439 0.8371 0.8373 0.8479 
DW 1.7203 1.9987 1.8655 1.8723 2.0558 
Nº of observations 70 70 69 69 70 
The t statistics are in parentheses. * - Significant at the 1% level; ** - Significant at the 5% 
level; *** - Significant at the 10% level. 
 
The logistic transformation applied to the Moody’s data gives as a maximum 
prediction error of 5 notches for one country, Hong Kong, and of 4 notches for 
another single country, Lebanon. All other countries get estimated ratings equal or 
below 3 points. Once again, the use of the logistic transformation improves the overall 
adjustment of the model. This is true since the absolute percentage average error for 
model M7 (logistic) is around 25 per cent, better than the absolute percentage average 
error of 30 per cent that was associated with model M4 (linear). Table 12 reports the 

















Table 12 – Prevision errors: model M7 from Table 11, logistic transformation 
 











P – R 
Argentina B2 2 3 1 Lithuania Ba1 6 6 0 
Australia Aa2 14 15 1 Luxembourg Aaa 16 16 0 
Austria Aaa 16 15 -1 Malaysia Baa2 8 6 -2 
Barbados Baa2 8 9 1 Malta A3 10 9 -1 
Belgium Aa1 15 15 0 Mexico Baa3 7 7 0 
Bolivia B1 3 2 -1 Morocco Ba1 6 6 0 
Brazil B1 3 6 3 Netherlands Aaa 16 15 -1 
Bulgaria B2 2 5 3 New Zealand Aa2 14 13 -1 
Canada Aa1 15 15 0 Norway Aaa 16 16 0 
Chile Baa1 9 7 -2 Pakistan Caa1 1 3 2 
China A3 10 8 -2 Panama Ba1 6 3 -3 
Colombia Ba2 5 4 -1 P. New Guinea B1 3 3 0 
Cyprus A2 11 14 3 Paraguay B2 2 4 2 
Czech Rep. Baa1 9 6 -3 Peru Ba3 4 2 -2 
Denmark Aaa 16 16 0 Philippines Ba1 6 5 -1 
Egypt Ba1 6 7 1 Poland Baa1 9 7 -2 
El Salvador Baa3 7 6 -1 Portugal Aa2 14 12 -2 
Estonia Baa1 9 6 -3 Romania B3 1 2 1 
Finland Aaa 16 15 -1 Russia B3 1 1 0 
France Aaa 16 15 -1 Singapore Aa1 15 16 1 
Germany Aaa 16 15 -1 Slovakia Ba1 6 6 0 
Greece A2 11 12 1 Slovenia A2 11 9 -2 
Hong Kong A3 10 15 5 South Africa Baa3 7 6 -1 
Hungary A3 10 7 -3 Spain Aa2 14 13 -1 
Iceland Aa3 13 16 3 Sweden Aa1 15 15 0 
India Ba2 5 7 2 Switzerland Aaa 16 16 0 
Ireland Aaa 16 16 0 Taiwan Aa3 13 14 1 
Israel A2 11 14 3 Thailand Baa3 7 5 -2 
Italy Aa3 13 14 1 Trin. and Tob. Baa3 7 8 1 
Jamaica Ba3 4 5 1 Turkey B1 3 2 -1 
Japan Aa1 15 16 1 UK Aaa 16 15 -1 
Jordan Ba3 4 6 2 USA Aaa 16 16 0 
Kazakhstan Ba2 5 5 0 Uruguay Baa3 7 6 -1 
Korea Baa2 8 9 1 Venezuela B2 2 3 1 
Latvia Baa2 8 6 -2      
Lebanon B1 3 7 4      
 
In line with the other models analysed, Figure 5 illustrates also the prediction 




























Doing again the comparison between the prediction errors of models M4 (linear) and 
M7 (logistic), for instance for the EU-15 countries, it is possible to say that the 
logistic transformation appears to perform better than the linear transformation. 
Indeed, the cumulative prediction errors of 15 points from model M4 are now reduced 
to 11 points with model M7. Therefore, using both rating notations, from S&P and 
from Moody’s, one gets better adjustments with a logistic transformation of the 
qualitative data. This implies the absence of a linear transition from one notch to the 
next, along the rating scale. 
 
5 – Conclusion 
 
This study tried to understand the determinants of sovereign credit rating, using data 
for the two major agencies: Moody’s and S&P. The variables that seem to have 
statistically significant explanatory power for the rating levels are: GDP per capita, 
external debt as a percentage of exports, the level of economic development, default 
history, real growth rate and the inflation rate. The GDP per capita is a rather 
important variable when estimating the appropriate rating level both for developed 
and developing countries. The external debt variable is basically relevant for 
developing countries. The maximum prediction errors are 4 and 5 notches, for a rather 
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small number of countries: Chile, Pakistan, Paraguay, Bulgaria, Lebanon and Hong 
Kong. These results are consistent with previous empirical work offered by the 
literature.14 
 
For the empirical implementation of the models, I used both a linear transformation 
and a logistic transformation of the qualitative rating data. The results of the 
estimations using the logistic transformation turned out to be better for the overall 
sample, particularly for the countries placed on the top end of the rating scale. For 
instance, with data from S&P, the absolute percentage average error of the selected 
model is around 23 per cent if one uses the logistic transformation and around 30 per 
cent when using the linear transformation. The ability of the model to duplicate the 
actual country ratings is also more satisfactory with the logistic transformation, using 
data from Moody’s. 
  
Of the several fiscal variables tested, only the budget balance was moderately relevant 
in explaining the rating level. Future analysis could take into consideration several 
components of public expenditures and revenues. In fact, when facing fiscal episodes, 
the assessment of its success in balancing public accounts may hinge on the 
composition of the episode.15 Also, taking into account implicit public pension 
liabilities, as part of the country global fiscal unbalance, might be perceived by capital 
markets as future borrowing requirements, not fully embedded in the public fiscal 
figures, leading therefore to added country risk.16 Still another additional 
improvement for the models would be to consider the political risk of each 
sovereign.17  
 
Finally, if one collects data on the changes of the rating levels for each country, 
throughout a series of years, one can pursue another approach by assessing the factors 
that help explain the upgrade or the downgrade of the rating notations. This is a line 
                                               
14 See Haque et al. (1996) and Cantor and Packer (1996). 
15 On these topics see for instance Kneller et al. (1999) and Afonso (2001). 
16 Holzmann et al. (2001) report and review some data on this issue. 
17 Haque et al. (1998) mention nevertheless that the introduction of political variables, as 
explanatory factors of the rating levels, does not give much additional information over models 
where those variables are not included. 
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of work that may be followed in future research but was outside the scope of this 
study. 18 
 
Annex – Data and sources 
 
GDP per capita  – dollars, figures for 2000, source: S&P; 
Inflation rate – 1998-2000, source: IMF and EC; 
GDP real growth rate – 1998-2000, source: IMF, OECD and EC; 
Developed country classification – source: IMF (2001), Table B of the 
Statistical Appendix; 
Default history – source: S&P; 
External debt-to-exports ratio – figures for 2000, source: Moody’s. 
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